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It is a time not of convergence but of divergence of 
ideas and ideologies. 
- Robert Kagan, 20071 
 
There is no objective reason that makes a U.S.-
Chinese clash inevitable.  But preparing for it, or even 
talking too much about it, actually makes it more 
possible. 
- Gwynne Dyer, 20062 
 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington, foreign 
policy statements and speeches emanating from the Bush administration and their 
allies presented the world in starkly opposed terms.  It was made clear that an 
apocalyptic battle against global terrorism was now underway, and that each person 
and each nation-state had to decide which side they would take in the struggle.  There 
was to be no middle ground, no raising of critical questions or alternative solutions.  
In the early stages of the war on terror a good degree of international unity was 
maintained, with a large coalition participating in the invasion of Afghanistan and few 
objections raised to the lack of Security Council authorisation for that attack.  With 
the onset of the Iraq War, however, the lines again became blurred, as many critical 
voices arose from many parts of the world opposing the violence that has been visited 
upon the people of Iraq and the false pretences by which it was justified.  It now 
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appears that the ‗with us or against us‘ logic of the Bush Doctrine is fading and new 
divisions are emerging that will mark the near future of international politics.  
With the re-emergence of China as an economic powerhouse and growing 
military presence in the Asia-Pacific, we are now beginning to see the re-inscription 
of boundaries between China and the United States, which have the potential to 
intensify a sense of fear about what the future holds.  In this context, it is necessary to 
ask some critical questions about the nature of this relationship and the assumptions 
that underpin the dominant interpretations of it. It is also essential that we remain 
suspicious of any attempts to portray the relationship between these ‗great powers‘ as 
one of intractable hostility and inevitable rivalry that can only be managed through 
the threat or exercise of military force.  Any attempt to reconstruct the dynamics of 
the Cold War ‗balance of terror‘ should, therefore, be resisted if we are serious about 
building a more secure and prosperous world.  But the questions remain: How can 
mutual trust and understanding be built amid an anarchical international order?  How 
can differences over political and social organisation be set aside in pursuit of a better 
future?  Is there any coherent way of challenging the embedded norms of international 
relations in order to prevent the onset of yet another costly and violent battle between 
two great powers? 
In order to more fruitfully explore these issues, this paper will give an 
overview of the critical challenges posed by new theories of discourse to the dominant 
paradigms of international relations.  It will begin with an explanation of the key 
principles of contemporary discourse theory and conclude with some critical 
reflections on the current state of relations between China and the United States.  In 
particular, it will seek to break down the sense of inevitability that figures in many 
analyses of the relationship between China and the United States and suggest that 
there is a need for those in journalism and academia to resist easy conclusions about 
the nature of the ‗other‘ that would only harden the boundaries between the people of 
the two countries and lead to an intensification of hostilities with the potential for 
military conflict. 
Introducing Discourse Theory 
The first and most important element of discourse theory is the challenge that it poses 
to the foundationalist theories of knowledge that are inherent in both liberal and 
Realist theories of international relations. From a discourse theory perspective, 
knowledge is never fixed and stable, but is produced and reproduced through 
discursive activity. As a consequence, we might say that liberal claims about the 
universality of human rights, or Realist claims concerning the anarchy of the 
international system, should never be understood as incontrovertible ‗truths‘, but 
rather as the contingent product of a complex history of competing social identities 
and power relationships.  Hence, as Bradley Klein explains: 
to be engaged in a discourse is to be engaged in the making and remaking of meaningful 
conditions of existence.  A discourse, then, is not a way of learning ‗about‘ something 
out there in the ‗real world‘; it is, rather, a way of producing that something as real, as 
identifiable, classifiable, knowable, and therefore, meaningful.  Discourse creates the 
conditions of knowing.
3
 
In these terms, discourse theory can be understood as a dispensation of the ―realist 
claim concerning the existence of a world external to thought.‖4   
The value of such an approach is that it raises questions about the modern 
obsession with scientific discovery and explanation of fixed and repetitive structures 
of political and social life.  This, in turn, creates space for political and social change 
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by denying the possibility of a scientifically observable, static ‗real world‘ outside the 
realms of human imagination and interpretation.  More specifically, in the analysis of 
dominant interpretations of the relations between China and the United States, 
discourse analysis allows a shift in emphasis away from discovering or explaining the  
incontrovertible ‗facts‘ of that relationship, to how and why the social and political 
conditions supporting the dominant narrative arose, how it has come to be such key 
issue in the theory and practice of contemporary international relations, and who 
suffers as a result.  
It is in this context that I will be utilising the theories of discourse stemming 
from the complex and challenging texts of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, 
notions of hegemony expounded in contemporary interpretations of the works of 
Italian socialist Antonio Gramsci, and the contemporary synthesis of these approaches 
in the theories of discourse and radical democracy advanced by, amongst others, 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.  Jacob Torfing‘s work, New Theories of 
Discourse provides an excellent basis for such an overview, as it focuses on the key 
interrelated concepts of discourse, hegemony, and social antagonism.
5
  I will follow 
the general contours of Torfing‘s analysis in relating an outline of discourse theory, 
with particular emphasis on those elements which are pertinent for an analysis of 
humanitarian intervention. 
As first step along this path, it is necessary to briefly explain some of the 
linguistic origins of contemporary discourse theory.  The work of Roland Barthes, 
who heeded the call of Saussure in his enunciation of a ‗science‘ of semiology, has 
been particularly influential in this respect.
6
 Accepting the Saussurean notion of 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 As Saussure commented: ―when semiology becomes organized as a science, the question will arise 
whether or not it properly includes modes of expression based on completely natural signs, such as 
pantomime.  Supposing that the new science welcomes them, its main concern will still be the whole 
language as a differential system, but detaching it from the phonic and semantic forms 
which formed the basis of Saussure‘s studies,7 Barthes was able to apply these 
complex and challenging insights into human language and the process of 
‗signification‘ to a vast array of social subjects, such as film, advertising, food and 
cars.
8
  Language, from this perspective, was no longer to be understood solely as 
spoken words, but expanded to include ―any significant unit or synthesis, whether 
verbal or visual: a photograph will be a kind of speech for us in the same way as a 
newspaper article; even objects will become speech, if they mean something.‖9  In his 
book Mythologies, Barthes emphasises the point that semiology is a science ―dealing 
with values‖, which is ―not content with meeting the facts,‖ but which seeks to 
―define and explore them as tokens for something else.‖10  Thus, all meaning, attached 
to an array of ‗signifiers‘, could now be understood as having been created by and 
through a complex nexus of power, knowledge, and identity in human societies, 
leading to a situation where, as Laclau has explained: 
The way in which the speaker put sentences together could no longer be conceived as the 
expression of the whims of an entirely autonomous subject but, rather, as largely 
determined by the way in which institutions are structured, by what is ‗sayable‘ in some 
context, etc.
11 
Such theorising paved the way for the development of discourse analyses across the 
humanities.  A ‗discourse‘, in this sense, may be defined as ―a differential ensemble 
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of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated.‖12  This, Torfing 
argues, is a definition which is arrived at ―through the deconstruction of totalizing 
structures, or through the deconstruction of a notion of atomized social elements.‖13   
The mention of ‗deconstruction‘ as a tool for achieving insights into discursive 
practices immediately implicates the ‗post-modern‘ thought of Jacques Derrida who, 
while expressing some discomfort with the term ‗deconstruction‘ itself,14 is prepared 
to concede that: 
Perhaps, deconstruction would consist, if at least it did consist, in precisely that: 
deconstructing, dislocating, displacing, disarticulating, disjoining, putting ‗out of joint‘ 
the authority of the ‗is‘.15 
The attempt to question the foundational nature of ‗truth‘ – ―the authority of the ‗is‘‖ -  
in this manner is best achieved, according to Derrida, through a process of ‗double 
reading‘.  As Simon Critchley has explained: 
If the first moment of reading is the rigorous, scholarly reconstruction of the dominant 
interpretation of a text, its intended meaning (vouloir-dire) in the guise of a commentary, 
then the second moment of reading, in virtue of which deconstruction obeys a double 
necessity, is the destabilization of the stability of the dominant interpretation.
16
  
What is revealed through this deconstructive reading process is the complete 
dependence of the dominant approach on that which is excluded.
17
  This approach, 
therefore, reveals the impossibility of a transcendental signifier which has meaning in 
and of itself, placing all ‗text‘ (which, it must be noted, involves more than just 
written texts and ―implies all the structures called ‗real‘, ‗economic‘, ‗historical‘, 
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socio-institutional, in short: all possible referents‖18)  in necessary and inescapable 
relations, or hierarchies, of difference  which are constantly being renegotiated and 
reconfigured. 
In this way, Derrida has drawn attention to the absence of fixed centres, or 
eternal ‗truths‘, in human knowledge.  Accordingly, any apparent societal structures 
can never have a fixed and unchanging meaning, but rather are subject to ―endless 
displacements and substitutions of the centre.‖19  Or, as Torfing puts it: 
In the absence of a complete totalization a structure only exists as a field of signification 
within which an ambiguous and temporary order is established  by a multiplicity of 
mutually substituting centres.
20
  
These ―mutually substituting centres‖ give temporary internal structure to discourses, 
leading to the construction of a theory of knowledge which ―identifies truth with 
presence or logos.‖21  From this basis, the dominant Western philosophies, with their 
structural and scientific biases, are recognisable as logocentric, privileging a 
dichotomised understanding of phenomena which leads to a designation of an ‗inside‘ 
and an ‗outside‘, or a ‗real‘ and an ‗unreal‘ and, inevitably, the construction of 
temporary and contingent hierarchies of power dependent upon the imposition of 
disciplinary violence against the defective, the rogue, or ‗the other‘.  It is through this 
insight that the dominant Western approach – which may be described as one of 
―metaphysical closure‖22 - can be questioned, from its Greek ‗origins‘ to the post-
Enlightenment search for fixed, scientific meaning.  Logocentrism, in this sense, is 
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integral to a modernity which is founded upon the relentless pursuit of absolute truth 
and knowledge as the basis for the perfect society.
23
 
Adding even further difficulty to such a pursuit, Derrida argues that the act of 
partial closure, or fixing of a centre, within a finite language-based system of 
understanding, paradoxically produces an infinite and irreducible play of meaning 
outside the fixed centre.  Thus: 
If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the infiniteness of a field 
cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, but because the nature of the 
field – that is, language and a finite language – excludes totalization.  This field is in 
effect that of play, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field… there 
is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of 
substitutions.
24
 
This then leads to a situation where, in Derrida‘s own words, ―everything becomes 
discourse.‖25  Truth, from this perspective, is not eternal or natural, but contingent, 
arbitrary, and subject to change at any time.
26
  Thus it must be concluded that 
discourse, formed around a partially fixed centre, and moving amongst infinite 
possible substitutions, operates from a terrain of ‗undecidability‘,27 as there can never 
be any rational or factual basis which dictates the ‗decision‘ necessary for the 
construction of determinate discourses.  It is this approach to Western knowledge 
which, according to Critchley, constitutes ―a crucial step in the subversion of 
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dominant conceptions of society and the development of new political strategies.‖28  
Such a subversion of dominant conceptions of society is, I will argue, necessary if we 
are to avoid the recourse to war in China-U.S. relations in the years ahead. 
In addition to Derrida‘s insights it is also useful to engage the works of Michel 
Foucault who, in adopting a Nietzschean ‗genealogical‘ approach to the study of 
history, also comes to the conclusion that human knowledge is subject to ongoing 
discursive activity.  His argument follows that of Nietzsche in the belief that: 
Whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to 
new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it; all 
events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master, and all subduing and 
becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any 
previous ‗meaning‘ and ‗purpose‘ are necessarily obscured or even obliterated.29 
As is necessary in the development of a theory of discourse, Foucault, again following 
Nietzsche, offers a critique of singular, foundational ‗truth‘ as being ―undoubtedly the 
sort of error that cannot be refuted because it was hardened into an unalterable form in 
the long baking process of history.‖30 In this context, the task of the historian is then 
to utilise the Nietzschean concept of ―effective history‖ or genealogy, in order to 
record, 
the history of morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of 
liberty or of the ascetic life; as they stand for the emergence of different interpretations, 
they must be made to appear as events on the stage of historical process.
31 
What is revealed by such a study is the highly constructed nature of human thought 
and practice.  Everything becomes an event on ―the stage of historical process,‖ doing 
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away with the idea that an originating idea, event or principle lies behind human 
behaviour. 
In undertaking such genealogical work, Foucault stresses the importance of 
―events,‖ particularly ―war and battle,‖ as being formative of human knowledge and 
history.  International politics, in a Foucauldian sense, should therefore be studied ―in 
accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.‖32  This 
systemic study of struggles, he argues, leads to a realisation that ―Truth is already 
power… ‗Truth‘ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce 
and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it.‖33 This 
power, in turn, ―includes political structures, systems of rules and norms, techniques 
and apparatuses of government, dividing practices, and strategic relations between 
subjects who act upon each other.‖34 It is this theorisation of power and knowledge 
which, in concert with Derrida‘s principles of deconstruction and undecidability, will 
set the scene for the analysis of China-U.S. relations that will follow. 
In the context of this paper, therefore, it is necessary to raise questions as to 
how and why a discourse of rivalry or hostility between the U.S. and China has been 
constructed, who it serves, and how it relates to power in contemporary international 
society.  A more complex and nuanced account of this relationship can then be 
approached through an examination of the language which has accompanied recent 
developments, problematising and throwing into doubt the claims that posit future 
conflict between the powers as a rational or inevitable consequence of international 
political life.   
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It is from this basis that we must then ask: how is such a ‗truth‘ constructed?  
How are decisions taken in an ‗undecidable‘ world?  Who decides?  In order to 
approach these issues, some account must be given of the way this ever-present 
political activity operates in the context of ‗undecidable‘ social relations.  This 
account is given by Laclau, Mouffe and others, through a ‗post-Marxist‘ 
understanding of the Gramscian notion of hegemony, to which I will now turn my 
attention. 
Hegemony 
If, as described above, discourse analysis reveals the lack of fixed or closed meaning 
in society, hegemony, as understood by Laclau and Mouffe, aims to show the process 
by which the ‗empty space‘ left by deconstructive or genealogical readings of history 
is ‗filled in‘.35  It aims, in short, to theorise the constitutive basis of all political 
activity.  In this sense, politics may be simply construed as ―the taking of constitutive 
decisions in an undecidable terrain.‖36  However, given the necessarily exclusive 
results of any such constitutive decision in a social environment, as discussed above, 
Torfing concludes that politics must be understood as ―simultaneously, a constitutive 
and subversive dimension of the social fabric.‖37  It is such a definition, argues 
Torfing, which has led Laclau to assert the ―primacy of politics over the social.‖38  
For, according to Laclau:  
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Not only are social relations shaped and reshaped ultimately by political decisions; but 
these decisions do not realize some pregiven social reality, and politics will, therefore, 
take the form of a radical construction.
39 
This ―radical construction,‖ according to Laclau, is best defined in terms of 
Gramscian hegemony, in which political power is denoted by the ability of a certain 
political group to ―direct and dominate‖ the affairs of citizens within the state.40  What 
is most crucial for a theory of discourse, however, is that having established his basic 
concept of hegemony, Gramsci set about describing the society, or ‗terrain‘, from 
which ethico-political changes may emerge.  This was, as Susan Golding suggests, 
―precisely a discursive terrain, a terrain that entailed a variety of effective power 
relations, limits, and possibilities, each nuanced by social crisis and, as well, by force 
or consent.‖41  Competing ideologies could rise to hegemony from this terrain if they 
effectively articulated an ethico-political ideal in a way which would garner the 
requisite support from within society, but always operating from within the confines 
of the incumbent political discourse.  In this sense, we might say that the hegemon is 
the representative of the contingent ‗truth‘ of any given moment, of the particular as a 
universal.
42
  It is via this notion of hegemony that we can understand the lack of fixed 
political or social structures, and the manner in which political activity determines and 
shapes new structures of knowledge in a fluid discursive environment of ‗ideological 
moments‘.43  Thus, according to Gramsci: 
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The realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, 
determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of 
knowledge, a philosophical fact.
44
 
 
This represents the key element of the notion of hegemony employed by Laclau and 
Mouffe, who see hegemony and discourse as being ―mutually conditioned in the sense 
that hegemonic practice shapes and reshapes discourse, which in turn provides the 
conditions of possibility for hegemonic articulation.‖45  Rather than representing a 
static power bloc, hegemony comes to represent the interminable movement of power 
which occurs through changing discursive formations.  Or, in other words, hegemony 
―is no longer defined as an alliance of preconstituted identities, but rather a process of 
production of a new collective identity.‖46  
It is for these reasons that Gramsci underscored the role of what he termed the 
―organic intellectuals,‖ those in positions of educational  and administrative influence 
who could ultimately shape the ideological concerns of any given society, bringing 
about political and social transformation and the development of new hegemonies.
47
  
The production of collective identities in this manner is achieved, according to 
Foucault, through ―enunciative regularity,‖ which is vital in the formation of concrete 
discourses.  Or, to put it slightly differently, the coherence of discourses is ―given 
only in the shape of a regularity in dispersion.‖48 Laclau and Mouffe concur with this 
simple explanation, suggesting that discourses are formed and reformed through a 
process of ‗articulation‘, which may be defined as ―a practice establishing relations 
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among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice.‖49   
Such modifications, in a political sense, are generally associated with the rise 
and fall of competing ‗ideologies‘, which, Laclau argues, represent ―the non-
recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any 
ultimate suture‖ or ―the ‗will‘ to totality of any totalizing discourse.‖50  Ideology, in 
this sense, represents what Laclau sees as a simultaneously ―impossible but 
necessary‖ condition of the Western discursive environment, establishing the terms of 
the constitutive decision in an undecidable terrain, which is an essential element in the 
production and maintenance of any hegemony.
51
 The hegemonic or ideological agent, 
therefore, acts both within and without the partially fixed discourse of a given time, 
unifying elements from the ‗field of discursivity‘52 in order to alter relations of power 
in a given society.
53
 
Thus, this paper aims to demonstrate the role and effect of hostility toward 
China within the hegemonic order of a broadly-defined Western international system.  
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to the fundamental impossibility of metaphysical (or logocentric) closure and the associated irreducible 
struggles and antagonisms which that generates in our societies. It leads, in other words, to a 
persistence of belief (or faith) in the transcendental nature of Western principles of social organisation 
and, in turn, a faith in those who claim to be representing or expanding such principles. See Torfing, 
New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek, 116-17.  
In this vein, it may be said that the body of ideas which may in future be used to 
justify the use of violence are the ideological product of a temporary hegemonic order 
and, as such, are devoid of the certainties and truths upon which they base their 
claims.  Moreover, I would argue that the ‗demonisation‘ of China is some current 
international relations literature is integral to the maintenance of a hegemony of 
Western liberal democracies within the international system.  Commentary that 
focuses on intractable differences or unavoidable rivalries, in short, perpetuates 
discourses of superiority and inferiority which sustain the conditions of political 
power, or the ‗hegemonic apparatus‘, of our time.  What I seek to do is expose the 
hegemonic logic that motivates such divisive representations of U.S.-China relations 
and show that other paths may be followed. 
Social Antagonism and the Politics of Identity 
One further element of discourse theory needs to be explained.  In order to fully 
understand the current failings of humanitarian intervention, particularly through an 
explanation of the violence that it entails, it is necessary to focus upon the divisions 
and exclusions that are invoked in the discourses which surround it.  All logocentric 
knowledge, as described above, is dependent upon the creation of violent and easily 
recognisable divisions that reinforce the hegemonic status of the most powerful group 
or individual at any given time.  Torfing brings this connection between hegemony, 
discourse, and identity into sharper focus, arguing that: 
We can define hegemony as the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a 
dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed 
elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces.
54
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Having already noted the logocentric social structures of human societies as being 
dependent on that which is repressed and excluded, it follows that those identities 
which exist outside of a closed discourse may be referred to as the ‗constitutive 
outside‘ of that which is included.55 The defining relationship between discourse and 
identity politics thus becomes clear as:  
discourse, or discursive formation, establishes its limits by means of excluding a radical 
otherness that has no common measure with the differential system from which it is 
excluded, and that therefore poses a constant  threat to that very system.
56
 
This ‗constitutive threat‘ relationship, which necessarily involves acts of violent 
exclusion or repression,
57
 can also be clearly observed at the level of international 
theory and practice, as I will discuss below by reference to the work of David 
Campbell and Michael Shapiro. 
 However, it is first necessary to recognise how such a threat is designated and 
comes to have such a divisive effect.  In this respect, Laclau and Mouffe have 
conceived of all social identities as being ―crossing points between the logic of 
difference and the logic of equivalence.‖58  As such, identities are not formed as 
collisions of complete polar opposites, but through the presence of an external threat 
which leads to a response where ―a certain sameness of the differential moments 
[within a given society] will be established.‖59  It is, in other words, the constant fear 
of some kind of ‗exterior Other‘, always defined through the articulation of the 
hegemon, that unites societies that would otherwise find no common cause.  It is the 
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identification of this political process that has led to analyses of domestic and 
international societies in terms of a politics of identity. 
 In order to more fully appreciate the role of identity politics in the theory and 
practice of  international relations, I will now turn to some of the contemporary work 
that has linked the two fields.  Firstly, to David Campbell, who, in a wide ranging 
critique of US foreign policy, sets out his philosophical basis with the comment that: 
Identity is an inescapable dimension of being.  No body could be without it.  Inescapable 
as it is, identity – whether personal or collective – is not fixed by nature, given by God, 
or planned by intentional behaviour.  Rather, identity is constituted in relation to 
difference... the constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries 
which serve to demarcate an ‗inside‘ from an ‗outside‘, a ‗self‘ from an ‗other‘, a 
‗domestic‘ from a foreign‘.60  
Having already noted the role of hegemonic logic in deciding what is included and 
excluded from the discursively constructed ‗real‘, the addition of this concept of 
identity brings in to sharper focus the very power of hegemonic status: it is precisely 
the power to decide who or what constitutes the ‗we‘ by reference to ―who/what ‗we‘ 
are not and who/what ‗we‘ fear.‖61  This, as we shall see, is a power which is often 
expressed through the infliction of terrible violence under a certain national or 
ideological banner.
 
In this context, identity politics analyses in international relations have, 
unsurprisingly, largely focussed on the construction and maintenance of state 
(sovereign) power.  As Jim George points out: 
The concept of sovereignty in International Relations is commonly (Traditionally) 
perceived as synonymous with that of state power, the legitimate use of state violence, 
legal/territorial legitimacy, and, in Hobbesian terms, a supreme and necessary authority 
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in a leviathan-less world.  For those articulating their Realism in more explicitly 
systematic terms (e.g., neo-Realism), the sovereign rational actor (the state) engaged in 
an analogized politics of the market is the primary focus of attention.
62
 
The sovereign state, in discursive terms, acts as the staging ground for the expression 
of hegemonic power and as a space of inclusion and exclusion, acting ―in opposition 
to a world of anarchy ‗out there‘, always threatening to undermine rationality and 
truth, with its false beliefs and counterpractices.‖63 Indeed, Richard Ashley has argued 
that it is in ―the modern fusion of sovereign man and the sovereign state... that the 
modern ‗will to knowledge‘ and ‗will to power‘ are connected, most powerfully, in an 
institutionalized form.‖64  This being the case, it is fair to say that the modern 
sovereign state, in expressing the ‗will to knowledge‘ and the ‗will to power‘ has also, 
sadly, institutionalised the ‗call to arms‘. 
The logic of discipline and punishment which emanates from this sovereign 
entity is intensified through the fetishised belief in an anarchical international order, 
an idea which is crucial to the construction of ‗danger‘ in Realist political thought.  In 
explaining the effect of this belief in international relations, Michael Shapiro has 
demonstrated the way in which the tiny Central American state of Guatemala was 
represented as being ―part of that threatening realm of Otherness intrinsic to U.S. 
security discourse‖ in U.S. government foreign policy material throughout the 
1980s.
65
  The implausible notion that the state of Guatemala could somehow represent 
a danger to the interests of a giant like the U.S., Shapiro argues, is made possible, and 
perhaps necessary, through the Realist notion of anarchy, which suggests that ‗the 
international‘ is an arena without rules and, as such, is inhabited by an array of threats 
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to national security and sovereignty which must be effectively disciplined, 
domesticated, assimilated or annihilated before a secure nation-state environment can 
be established. The problem, as Shapiro sees it, is that the whole practice of foreign 
policy in the modern state system ―is one that sharpens boundaries,‖66 firmly defining 
an inside from an outside and, as a consequence: 
there exists a powerful impetus to violence in the form of armed interference by the 
modern state, and, as was the case with Rome, its ideational supports can be linked to 
foreign policy, to the ways in which self and Other are constituted and estrangements 
between the two are effected.
67
 
The obvious problem here, motivating the production of such statements and 
representations, is that an ongoing belief in ‗anarchy‘ and ‗danger‘ generates a 
perpetual insecurity which brings violent challenges between nations.  In essence, the 
crude politics of identity which is at the core of the dominant theories of international 
relations requires the continual representation of a dangerous world of Otherness in 
order to maintain the need for the nation-state as a social body.  As David Campbell 
puts it: 
Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, 
the state would cease to exist.  Security as the absence of movement would result in 
death via stasis.  Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is 
the guarantor of the state‘s continued success as an impelling identity.68 
In other words, the belief in international relations circles that sovereignty, anarchy 
and danger are objectively observable and unchangeable facts leads to a case of 
theory as practice par excellence.  It is a fearful, confrontational and ultimately 
violent view of the world which must be challenged if we are to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past. 
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 Discourses of Western Hegemony:                                      
Humanitarianism and Anti-terrorism 
There is no doubt that we currently live in a Western-dominated international order.  
The break-up of the Soviet Union put an end to the bipolarity of the Cold War era and 
generated much discussion over the final triumph of liberal-democracy as the last 
viable type of social organisation.
69
  Such optimism was soon reflected in the 
enthusiasm for carrying out military interventions in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, 
Haiti, Serbia, and East Timor, most often justified as actions to protect and restore 
human rights and democracy for those who had been abused by their own leaders.  
From a discourse analysis perspective, the most interesting theme to re-emerge in the 
1990s was that of ‗civilisation‘ fighting the final battles against ‗barbarism‘ in the 
quest for a democratic and peaceful world order. 
 The clearest example of the discourses of humanitarianism came with the 
NATO attack on Serbia in 1999.  According to Tony Blair, this conflict represented 
the humanitarian dimension of post-Cold War globalisation, where the suffering of  
people under the policies of their own governments should no longer be tolerated.
70
  
Thus, as Javier Solana argued at the 1999 Washington Summit: 
50 years ago, the signatories of the Washington Treaty vowed ‗to safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.‘  These values are as relevant today as 
they were in 1949… Today, they have to be defended against a brutal political leader, a 
leader whose policies of deliberately engineered hatred seems to come from an era long 
believed behind us.  If Europe is to enter the 21
st
 Century as a community of democracy, 
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pluralism, and human rights, we simply cannot tolerate this carnage at its centre… Now, 
as in 1949, we are called upon to demonstrate that values are not only something to be 
preached, but upheld.
71 
What we can see, therefore, are discourses that demarcate a boundary between the 
democratic, human rights-respecting West, and the tyrannical, authoritarian, human 
rights-abusers, exemplified in the figure of Slobodan Milosevic.  This upholds a sense 
of Western global power as virtuous power and validates the use of military force 
against those who are not seen to be living up to the required standards of civilised 
life in the post-Cold War era.  In the process, it becomes legitimate to bomb all parts 
of Serbia, kill hundreds of civilians, and destroy vital public infrastructure even in the 
absence of clear international legal authority.  Notions of ‗just war‘ and the 
‗responsibility to protect‘ supported such claims, leading many to believe that an 
unprecedented era of co-operation on human rights and universal justice was at hand. 
 This mood of optimism and triumphalism came to an abrupt end with the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.  At this time, many proponents of humanitarian 
intervention predicted that a new era of national self-interest would emerge and the 
progressive human rights agenda of the 1990s would fall by the wayside.
72
  What has 
transpired since then, however, does not necessarily support such a conclusion.  If we 
examine the language used by Tony Blair and George W. Bush, we can see that the 
humanitarian logic that drove the intervention in Serbia in 1999 has remained very 
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much alive and well in the context of the war on terror.  References to the spread of 
democracy, the protection of human rights, and the eventual achievement of a stable 
and peaceful world order have been common.
73
 
The United States, in particular, has continued to justify its aggressive 
approach to Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of human rights promotion and 
democratisation.  In this sense, many of the neo-conservatives who were instrumental 
in the development of the Bush Doctrine following the September 11 attacks have 
continued to claim that an American ‗benevolent hegemony‘ is the only path to 
securing a peaceful international order, and that a massive military budget is required 
to back up that commitment with force.
74
  Whether or not their humanitarian motives 
are sincere, we must understand the way in which the apparently positive ideals of 
democracy and human rights have come to support the disastrous war in Iraq and the 
related instances of torture and abuse that the world has witnessed over the past five 
years.   
The argument being made here, of course, is that the very clear divide that has 
been drawn between Islam and the West in the context of the war on terror has very 
clear political effects, insofar as it justifies and reinforces a Western (U.S.-led) 
hegemony in international affairs. More worrying, from the discourse theory 
perspective, is the recognition that such interventions against ‗rogues‘ and ‗tyrants‘ 
must continually occur if the major Western powers, led by the United States, were to 
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sustain their own identity as the centres of virtuous global power.
75
  In the absence of 
a Slobodan Milosevic or a Saddam Hussein, for example, the logic of Western 
hegemony becomes far less clear and the exercise of force becomes less justifiable 
and meaningful.  It is in this context that U.S. relations with China become of even 
greater concern, as a number of U.S. commentators and policy makers, including 
many of the neo-conservative persuasion, have begun to turn their attention to the 
emerging ‗threat‘ that China is said to represent, painting U.S.-China relations in the 
same divisive manner. 
Discourses of China in U.S. Foreign Policy 
For many commentators on international affairs the gradual transformation of the 
Chinese economy since the 1980s to a more market-based, capitalist style has been a 
very positive development.  From this perspective, these economic transformations 
signalled a departure from a more hardline communism that was understood by many 
to be indicative of a broader political and social transformation.
76
  As a consequence, 
many neo-liberals have encouraged and applauded these market reforms in the belief 
that China represents an unparalleled economic ‗opportunity‘ that should be grasped 
by corporate actors around the world and, more importantly, that through such 
reforms China will become a country more in tune with Western standards and 
interests and therefore, less of a threat.  Such an attitude on the part of scholars and 
policy-makers was prevalent throughout the Clinton presidency and – after a difficult 
start under the Bush presidency – in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.  It is 
through this discourse, which views China as an economic ‗opportunity‘ and as a 
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potential ally in the war on terror, that much of the hardline rhetoric representing 
Chian as a ‗threat‘ to international peace and security has been tempered.     
Yet despite the generally positive economic sentiments that have emerged 
over recent decades, many in Washington continue to speak in terms of an irreducible 
gap between the liberal-democratic United States and the Communist and 
authoritarian China.  This is where the ‗threat discourse‘ becomes more unsettling, as 
it seeks to place China in a subordinate position in relation to U.S. standards and 
insists that the differences between the countries are likely to be a source of future 
conflict.  As a consequence, we see simplistic divisions being drawn that characterise 
China as autocratic, non-transparent, and abusive of human rights, always in contrast 
to the democratic, open, human rights-respecting United States.  These simple 
dichotomies are problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they ―result in 
skewed impressions of the ordinary Chinese as an aggressive people and race‖ and 
create an atmosphere that ―holds out very little hope for those seeking a stable process 
by which the PRC is able to negotiate its place in the current world order.‖77  These 
narratives of China as threat generally emerge from two perspectives: the geo-
strategic, neo-realist view which sees China as a potential imbalancer in future 
international affairs; and the more clearly ideological neo-conservative view, which 
focuses on the undemocratic nature of the Chinese regime and seeks a more 
aggressive U.S. policy in response. 
Indeed, the question of democracy has become central to the portrayals of 
China as a threat that have emerged in recent years.  Following the discourses of 
humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and the war on terror more recently, such 
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critiques of China work to reinforce impressions that China is a ‗backward‘ society 
that is not to be trusted at the higher levels of international life.  From this perspective, 
neo-conservative scholar Robert Kagan has recently argued in favour of the formation 
of new international institutions that only represent democratic countries, in order to 
counter what he sees as the new threat of an ‗autocratic‘ alliance led by China and 
Russia.
78
  Such a development will be necessary, argues Kagan, as the world again 
divides into a Cold War-style conflict between the liberal-democratic West and the 
‗autocratic‘ states of China and Russia.  He goes on argues that such a divide will be 
necessary if the Western nations want to continue to carry out humanitarian 
interventions that ―autocratic nations refuse to countenance‖79 in places such as 
Sudan. This discourse, which seeks to generate and sustain a new division in 
international politics on the grounds that this is the ‗normal‘ state of affairs, must be 
closely watched, particularly considering the devastating effects that such 
commentators have had in the post-September 11 world.   
Another way in which the democratic/autocratic divide comes into U.S. 
foreign policy-making in relation to China is through the impression of China as a 
‗closed‘ or ‗non-transparent‘ society.  This discourse is evident in the recent Annual 
Report to Congress on the ―Military Power of the People‘s Republic of China,‖ as 
well as in the comments that have accompanied this report.  As the 2007 report 
argues: 
The outside world has limited knowledge of the motivations, decision-making, and key 
capabilities supporting China‘s military modernization… This lack of transparency in 
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China‘s military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses 
that hedge against the unknown.
80
 
Once again, the idea is that policy-makers in the United States cannot be sure what 
military capabilities China has obtained or may obtain due to the secretive and 
undemocratic nature of the regime.  Hence, an argument is made that it is prudent to 
increase U.S. military readiness for a conflict by assuming the worst.  As many 
Chinese commentators and political leaders have argued, this appears to represent a 
re-emergence of the ―cold war mentality‖ which pits the virtuous and democratic 
United States against the autocratic image of China.
81
 
 This attitude has also led to the apparent re-emergence of a ‗containment‘ 
policy toward China, as the U.S. continues to build and upgrade defence pacts with 
nations such as Japan, Australia, and India.  As Tony Pratt has pointed out: 
As justification for this [contain China] policy choice there‘s ‗code talk‘ of common 
democratic values, China‘s extensive and secretive development of its military power, 
rogue states, the ubiquitous terrorist threat, the need to contribute to regional security 
etc.
82
 
Here again the significance of the democratic/autocratic discourse becomes evident, 
as military policy seems to be determined in accordance with the political principles 
that each country adopts.   The danger, as pointed out in a 2005 New York Times 
editorial is that ―this neo-containment policy would become a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
leading China to start throwing its own military and economic weight around to break 
out of the containment trap.‖ 
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 Overall, a sense is being generated by many that China cannot fit into a 
modern international order unless it follows a path of ‗westernisation‘ in both 
economic and political terms.
83
  This approach has the effect of not only justifying the 
intensification of military build-up between the two major powers, but also of 
masking the sheer complexity of political and social life in both China and the United 
States.  In other words, simplistic ‗china threat‘ discourses actually serve to diminish 
our knowledge of the world, leading only to a greater sense of fear and insecurity and 
reeducing the possibilities for peaceful co-existence.  There are far too many potential 
‗triggers‘ that could ignite this fear into full-scale conflict – including the Taiwan 
issue, the remilitarisation of Japan, and the North Korean nuclear issue – to allow 
these divisive discourses to take hold of international politics.  As journalists and 
academics it is, therefore, important that we take some responsibility for the way in 
which we speak and write about the China-U.S. relationship.  It would be dangerous, 
in these circumstances, to accept and promote a naïve and simplistic understanding of 
China, including an uncritical acceptance of the moral claims made by many critics of 
the current Chinese administration.  Likewise, it is necessary not to avoid simple 
portrayals of the United States and their Western allies as imperialist aggressors with 
whom no common cause can be found.  If such simplistic images of these vast and 
complex societies are allowed to dominate, then we will surely end up on a road 
toward rivalry and conflict that would have negative consequences for many millions 
of people in the Asia-Pacific region.  Working toward mutual accommodation and 
peaceful interaction also involves a continuing critique of the dominant theories of 
international relations that rest upon assumptions about the violence of human nature 
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and the anarchy of the international order.  The drawing of strict boundaries and the 
attempt to establish unchallengeable ‗truths‘ about the hidden intentions of one side or 
the other should, in this context, be avoided.  It is through the application of discourse 
theory that such critiques become possible. 
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